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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
time the facts of a case litigated in the New York courts fall within
the section. Of great importance was the fact that the instant
dispute affected the testamentary dispositions of a New York domiciliary. Because of the dominant interest which New York has in
this matter, a strong protective policy appears justified. It should
be remembered, however, that public policy should not be the sole
ground for deciding a conflict of laws problem, except in a clear
case.2 That the court considered the instant case to be a clear one,
there is no doubt; but it may be questioned whether New York, the
forum, would have invoked the public policy argument had it not
been simultaneously the domicile.
Marriage
Should a marriage, valid where celebrated but void were it
performed in the parties' domicile, be recognized in the latter state I
The generally recognized rule is that a marriage which is valid
at the place of celebration is valid everywhere. 24 There are, however, two broadly stated exceptions to this rule :5 the first includes
marriages which are contrary to natural law as it is generally
regarded in Christian countries, 2 6 and the second includes marriages which the legislature of the forum has declared to be invalid because violative of some particularly strong local policy.2 7
The latter exception has caused some difficulty, since courts differ
on the question of whether a particular prohibition is such a strong
expression of local policy that a marriage must be declared invalid
regardless of the place where it was contracted. 2 8
23. "Local policy should not . . . be an instnmentalitv for rationalization of
refusal to give effect to the law of another state, unless there is some exceptional and
unusually sound reason." STUMMERG, CONFLICT oF LAws 146 n. 47 (2d ed. 1951);
see
Lorenzen, supra note 13. at 337.
24. 2 BEALF, op. cit. siipra note 11, at 669.
25. In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428 (1927) ; GooDRicH, op. cit.
supra note 14. § 116.
26. To bring it within the meaning of this exception, the marriage must be
either incestuous (between persons in the direct line of consanguinity
or between
brother and sister) or polygamous. In re Miller's -Estate, supra note 25 at 457, 214
N. W. at 429.
27. STUMERG, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 232. It may be noted that the second
exception coincides, for all practical purposes, with the conflicts rule prevailing
in some
states requiring compliance with the law of the domiciliary state for the validation
of a marriage, regardless of the law of the place of the marriage.
28. "A marriage which is prohibited here by statute, because contrary to the
policy of our laws, is yet valid if celebrated elsewhere according to the law of the
place, even if the parties are citizens and residents of this Commonwealth, and have
gone abroad for the purpose of evading our laws, unless the Legislature has clearly
enacted that such marriages out of the state shall have no validity here."
v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 464, 18 Am. Rep. 509, 514-515 (1873). But cf.Commonwealth
In re Stull's
Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 632-633, 39 Atl. 16, 18 (1898), in which it was said that a marriage
is invalid where it offends the prevailing sense of good morals of the domiciliary
state and there was an intention to evade the positive law of the domicile.
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The Court of Appeals was faced with such a problem in the
case of In re May's Estate.9 The issue arose in a proceeding to
determine whether letters of administration should be granted to
the child or to the husband of a marriage attacked as invalid. The
marriage was between two New York domiciliaries, uncle and
niece, who had journeyed to Rhode Island apparently for the sole
purpose of contracting marriage. In Rhode Island a marriage
between uncle and niece is considered valid if the parties are members of the Jewish faith, whereas in New York such a marriage is
3
incestuous and voidY° The judgment of the Surrogate's Court '
DiviAppellate
holding the marriage void was reversed by the
sion,32 with directions to grant letters to the husband.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming (5-1), restated the general
rule that a marriage valid where 3performed is valid everywhere,
together with its two exceptions.1 As to the first exception, a
marriage between uncle and niece, valid under Mosaic law and expressly declared good by the legislature of Rhode Island, was held
not offensive to the public sense of morality and thus not within
the prohibitions of natural law.34 Chief Judge Lewis interpreted
the second exception, viz., cases within the prohibition of positive
law, to mean that unless there is a statute clearly expressing the
Legislature's intent to regulate within New York marriages of
its domiciliaries solemnized abroad, there is no "positive law"
within the contemplation of the exception. Since New York could
have enacted such a statute35 but has not seen fit to do so, the
court would not extend the scope of the present statute by judicial
construction. Neither exception being present, the court concluded that since the marriage was valid where performed it was valid
in New York.
Judge Desmond, the sole dissenter, seemed to advocate a more
liberal interpretation of the second exception, to the effect that as
29. 305 N. Y. 486, 114 N. E. 2d 4 (1953).
30. N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 5 (3).
31. 110 N. Y. S. 2d 430 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
32. 280 App. Div. 647, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 345 (3d Dep't 1952).
33. See Van Voorhis v. Brintnall,86 N. Y. 18, 26-27, 40 Am. Rep. 505, 509 (1881);
Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 605, 43 Am. Rep. 189 (1882).
34. Accord, Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 138, 98 Atl. 358, 360 (1916),

"An incestuous marriage, within the meaning of our exception is . . . not every one
forbidden . . . by . . . legislative enactments . . ., for a State may prohibit . . .

matrimonial connections between persons related in blood or affinity, not incestuous by
natural law." But see United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886, 888 (D. C,.
E. D. Pa. 1901).
35. For example, several states have enacted laws similar to what was formerly
the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, § 1, 9 U. L. A. 480 (1942), "If any person residing
. . . in this state . . . shall go into another state or country and there contract a
marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall
be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state."
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long as the prohibitions of a statute indicate that public policy of
the domicile is against the marriage in question, such marriage
must fall. 36 He further indicated that all the subdivisions of § 5
should be given equal construction. Therefore, since the first two
subsections, which invalidate marriages between ancestor and descendant or brother and sister, are given extraterritorial effect, the
third should be likewise construed.8T
Thus, it appears the Court of Appeals has clearly indicated
by reason of its strict interpretation of the second exception that,
even as to domiciliaries, no extraterritorial effect will be given to
Domestic Relations Law § 5 (3). If the first two subsections are
to be given extraterritorial effect, it is not because the cases within
their scope are "prohibited by positive law," but because such
marriages are generally regarded with abhorrence by all Christian

countries.
Contracts
The problem of the recognition of exchange controls in conflict of laws has become increasingly important in the past few
years by virtue of their almost universal usage. Early cases often
ignored or refused to apply the foreign exchange restrictions,
primarily on the ground of repugnance to the public policy of the
forum. Whereas two decades ago we would have looked askance
at such regulations, today we can count the countries which do
not have currency restrictions on the fingers of one hand. Although the United States has no such controls, it recognizes and
gives some effect to those of other countries."' Despite this fact,
the law is not fully settled as to whether the courts will uphold
defenses based on such restrictions in all cases.
The Court of Appeals was faced with a reasonably uncomplicated version of this problem in Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank
in Liq.8 Under an agreement with defendant's predecessor bank,
36. But see RESTATEMENT, op. cit. wnpra note 2, § 134, comment b, "The mere
fact that the foreign marriage would have been contrary to the statute of the forum had
it occurred within the state, does not make it so offensive to local policy as to be refused
enforcement."
37. See 2 BF.o. L. REv. 325 (1953) (instant case noted in Appellate Division
stage).
38. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act, , 11, 59 STAT. 516 (1945), 22 U. S. C.
§286 h (1946), gives ful force and effect in the United States to certain sections of
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, among which is the
first sentence of Art. VIII, § 2(b) : "Exchange contracts which involve the currency
of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that
member maiptained or imposed consistently with this Agreement, shall be unenforceable
in the territories of any member." See Kraiu v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681,
685, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 208, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
39. 304 N. Y. 533, 110 N. E. 2d 6 (1953).

